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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Ester Carter appeals from a judgment of the district court 
convicting him of one count of conspiracy to launder drug 
trafficking proceeds in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1956(h) and 
two counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1956(a)(3)(b).1 Carter's conviction was one of several that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Carter was sentenced to a prison term of 48 months, a fine of 
$30,000, and 3 years supervised release. 
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arose out of a government undercover operation in which 
Special Agent Louis Oubre of the Internal Revenue Service 
posed as a drug dealer named "Louis Richard." The 
background facts are set forth at length in our opinion in 
United States v. Nolan-Cooper, Nos. 97-1171 and 97-1298 
(3d Cir. filed September 1, 1998) and in the district court's 
opinion denying Carter's Rule 29 motion. See United States 
v. Carter, 966 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 
The principal issue on the present appeal is whether the 
district court committed prejudicial error when it admitted 
two statements by Angela Nolan-Cooper, who was Carter's 
attorney and was also an alleged coconspirator, pursuant 
to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). In addition, Carter challenges 
the district court's failure to charge the jury with his 
proposed money laundering instruction, and the limits the 
court placed upon his cross-examination of Agent Oubre. 
Because all of these challenges are without merit, we will 
affirm.2 
 
I. The Coconspirator Statements 
 
Carter first argues that the district court erred in 
allowing the government to introduce two statements made 
by Nolan-Cooper that were contained in tape recorded 
conversations she had with Agent Oubre on February 7 and 
9, 1994. The challenged statements were made by Nolan- 
Cooper during her initial two meetings with Agent Oubre. 
At these meetings Oubre explained that he was a drug 
dealer and needed assistance in making it appear that his 
drug proceeds came from a legitimate source. 
 
In the first challenged statement, Nolan-Cooper explained 
to Oubre how he could launder the drug proceeds by 
investing in a recording studio run by one of her "clients" 
(Carter does not dispute that he was the person about 
whom Nolan-Cooper was speaking): 
 
       I have someone who's in a very similar situation with 
       you ... that ... has a recording studio.... In South 
       Jersey.... I'll be very honest with you. He has been in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231. 
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       it and he's lost money.... He's lost money because he 
       was involved with somebody he shouldn't have been 
       involved with.... But even in losing the money... it's 
       helped him to legitimize everything else.... So he hasn't 
       had any problems. And he's another person that I'm 
       back and forth. I do the same thing with him.... So I 
       mean, that's the one thing that's already established 
       here, if you wanted to become an investor in something 




In the second recorded conversation, Nolan-Cooper again 
discussed with Oubre the possibility of investing in Carter's 
recording studio: 
 
       [T]he gentleman who's still involved ... in this business 
       now, ... he started out, he bought some bars ... and he 
       put the poker machines ... and he has made millions 
       and millions of dollars on those poker machines... in 
       his bars. And he doesn't show for it, if you saw him... 
       and, I mean, he's an older man. He's just in his sixties 
       .... he drives around in a 1971 Chevy Impala.... He 
       wears old clo[thes] ... you would never think ... but he 




It is not seriously disputed that, prior to the events 
leading to the present indictment, a money laundering 
operation had been established involving at least Nolan- 
Cooper and Carter, whereby Carter's recording studio was 
used to launder the proceeds of illegal gambling (video- 
poker) activities.3 The evidence also established that the 
recording studio was later used as a false address in order 
to legitimize a sham corporation set up by Nolan-Cooper to 
launder Agent Oubre's purported drug proceeds, and that, 
to this end, Carter and Oubre both signed a backdated 
lease, and Carter accepted "rent" payment totaling several 




3. At all events, such a conclusion is supported by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
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Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) excepts from the definition of 
hearsay "a statement by a coconspirator of a party during 
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." In order 
for an out-of-court statement to be admissible pursuant to 
Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the district court must find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) a conspiracy 
existed; (2) the declarant and the party against whom the 
statement is offered were members of the conspiracy; (3) 
the statement was made in the course of the conspiracy; 
and (4) the statement was made in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 
333-34 (3d Cir. 1992). Where the district courtfinds that a 
conspiracy existed, we review the district court'sfindings as 
to these elements for clear error. See United States v. Cruz, 
910 F.2d 1072, 1081 n.11 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
While the district court offered alternative bases for its 
decision to admit the challenged statements, and the 
ultimate basis for its decision is not entirely clear, we find 
the core of the court's reasoning to be contained in findings 
of fact made at the conclusion of the government's case. 
There, in accordance with the requirements set forth in 
McGlory, the district court, in essence, found that the 
statements were admissible since they were made during 
the course and in furtherance of a conspiracy that existed 
in February 1994 among Nolan-Cooper, Carter, and others 
to launder the proceeds of illegal transactions. See Carter, 
966 F. Supp. at 347. We conclude, based on our review of 
the record, that these findings are not clearly erroneous 
and thus that the statements were properly admitted. 
 
We pause, however, to consider the effect of a different 
view of the evidence urged upon us by Carter. According to 
Carter, when Nolan-Cooper made these statements in 
February 1994, there was at best a conspiracy in place 
solely to launder video poker money. He claims that in 
February 1994 he had not yet authorized Nolan-Cooper to 
extend the conspiracy to launder the proceeds of illegal 
drug activity, and that he did not give this authorization 
until his first conversation with Agent Oubre on March 11, 
1994. Thus, in Carter's view, there were two different 
conspiracies -- one the charged conspiracy to launder drug 
proceeds, and the other a conspiracy to launder video poker 
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proceeds. Based on this view, he contends that it was 
clearly erroneous for the district court to have admitted 
these statements because they were made in the course of 
and in furtherance of a conspiracy that was not charged in 
his indictment. While we agree with Carter that, for analytic 
purposes, the continuum of events might be viewed as 
containing two conspiracies, adopting such a view would 
not change the result. 
 
The law is well settled that out-of-court statements may 
be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) even if the defendant 
is not formally charged with any conspiracy in the 
indictment. See United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 
626 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Godinez, 110 F.3d 448, 
454 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rivera, 68 F.3d 5, 7 
(1st Cir. 1995). Thus, so long as the requirements set forth 
in McGlory are satisfied (as they are here), Nolan-Cooper's 
statements to Oubre are non-hearsay regardless of whether 
they were made in a conspiracy separate from that charged. 
See United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1128 (5th Cir. 
1993) ("[t]he conspiracy that forms the basis for admitting 
coconspirators' statements need not be the same 
conspiracy for which the defendant is indicted"). 4 Of course, 
not all nonhearsay is admissible in court -- only that which 
is relevant -- and thus the introduction of statements from 
an uncharged conspiracy might be precluded by application 
of Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Cf. In re 
Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 263 (3d 
Cir. 1983) ("Rule 402 affords adequate protection against 
admission of statements in furtherance of joint 
undertakings that are remote and unrelated to the 
conspiracy relied upon as a basis for liability."), rev'd on 
other grounds sub nom., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The cases relied on by Carter, Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 
(1974), and Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949), are 
inapposite, as they applied the pre-Federal Rules common law of 
evidence, which did include a requirement that the coconspirator's 
statement be made in furtherance of a charged conspiracy. See 
Anderson, 417 U.S. at 218. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) contains no such explicit 
requirement and, as noted in the text, courts (including this one) have 
uniformly read the Rule as not containing such a requirement. 
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In this vein, some courts require that in order for a 
coconspirator statement to be admitted, the conspiracy 
during which the statements were made must be "factually 
intertwined" with the offenses being tried. See United States 
v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 829 (2d Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 126, 131 (7th Cir. 1981). In our view, 
this salutary additional requirement is essentially a 
restatement of ordinary relevancy principles. Since the 
challenged statements are relevant to the crimes charged, 
we hold that they were properly admitted even if Carter's 
characterization of the evidence is correct.5 
 
II. Cross-Examination of Agent Oubre 
 
The second error raised on this appeal concerns the 
cross-examination of Agent Oubre. Oubre was called to the 
stand solely for the purpose of authenticating various tape 
recordings of conversations he had with Nolan-Cooper and 
other alleged co-conspirators. After the government's direct 
examination of Oubre, Carter and his co-defendant, Carl 
Ellis, moved to cross examine Oubre concerning the district 
court's earlier finding that he had testified falsely at a 
hearing concerning possible "outrageous government 
conduct" in the course of the investigation.6 Carter argued 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We also agree with the district court's conclusion that even if it were 
error to have admitted the statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), such 
error was harmless. Harmless error is "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity 
or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights." Fed. R. Crim. P. 
52(a). 
An error is harmless when we are certain "that the error did not 
prejudice the defendant[ ]," United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 220 
n.2 (3d Cir. 1984), and can say that it is "highly probable" that the 
district court's errors did not contribute to the conviction. See 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 
Here, the government offered overwhelming evidence of Carter's guilt at 
trial. Indeed, much of the evidence came from Carter's own mouth, as 
several of his conversations were recorded by Agent Oubre. We must 
therefore conclude that even if the court had erred in admitting Nolan- 
Cooper's statements, it is "highly probable" that their admission did not 
contribute to the conviction. 
 
6. For a fuller discussion of the alleged "outrageous government conduct" 
engaged in by Agent Oubre, see Nolan-Cooper, Nos. 97-1171 and 97- 
1298 (3d Cir. filed September 1, 1998). 
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that he should he be permitted to cross-examine Oubre in 
this manner on the ground that Oubre would be biased in 
favor of the government because his earlier false testimony 
could subject him to criminal charges. 
 
The district court sustained the government's objection to 
this line of inquiry on the ground that the proffered cross- 
examination exceeded the scope of direct examination and 
did not involve matters of credibility, see Fed. R. Evid. 
611(b), and on the basis that its probative value was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
see Fed. R. Evid. 403. We review the court's decision to 
limit cross-examination for abuse of discretion, see United 
States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 902 (3d Cir. 1991), and find 
none. 
 
Fed. R. Evid 611(b) limits the scope of cross examination 
"to the subject matter of the direct examination and 
matters affecting the credibility of the witness." Fed. R. 
Evid. 611(b). It is clear that the proposed questioning by 
Carter exceeded the very limited scope of Agent Oubre's 
direct examination. Carter nonetheless argues that it is 
permissible under Rule 611(b) since Agent Oubre's 
credibility was at issue. We disagree. Before trial, Carter 
waived his right to a Starks hearing and stipulated that the 
tape recordings made by the government during the 
undercover operation were accurate, authentic, and correct. 
Because Oubre testified only as to the foundational basis 
required to admit the recordings, his testimony was 
undisputed and his credibility was not at issue. 
 
The district court also concluded that the proposed 
questioning of Agent Oubre was precluded on the basis of 
Fed. R. Evid. 403, which grants the district court discretion 
to exclude evidence if "its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury . . . ." Fed R. Evid. 403. 
The district court reasoned that, because Oubre's testimony 
was limited to authenticating the tapes and Carter had 
stipulated as to the authenticity of the recordings, any 
questioning regarding the agent's potential bias would be of 
little or no probative value. On the other hand, the court 
reasoned that "the proffered cross-examination questions 
would have had a tendency to inflame the jury resulting in 
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significant prejudice." Carter, 966 F. Supp. at 353. The 
court concluded, therefore, that "the probative value of the 
proffered cross-examination is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice." Id. Because Oubre's 
testimony was limited to authenticating the tape recording, 
the district court did not abuse its discretion under either 




7. Carter's final contention is that he was denied a fair trial when the 
district court refused to give a jury instruction that he requested 
regarding the "intent to conceal" element of the money laundering 
charge. This argument is patently without merit. 
 
When charging the jury, the district court must provide it with "a clear 
articulation of the relevant legal criteria." United States v. Goldblatt, 
813 
F.2d 619, 623 (3d Cir. 1987). However, determining the specific language 
used is within the sound discretion of the district court and will be 
reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. See id. A jury instruction does 
not constitute reversible error if the instruction "fairly and adequately" 
presents the issues in the case without confusing or misleading the jury. 
See United States v. Simon, 995 F.2d 1236, 1243 n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(citations omitted). Nor is a defendant entitled to a jury instruction of 
his 
own choosing. See United States v. Salerno, 66 F.3d 544, 549 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
Since Carter's primary defense to the money laundering charge was 
that his actions in dealing with Agent Oubre were so open and notorious 
that he did not have the requisite intent to conceal or disguise the 
source of Oubre's "drug money," he requested a money laundering 
instruction that underscored the government's burden of proof in this 
regard. The district court concluded that Carter's proposed instruction 
was merely "redundant in emphasizing the intent element of the crime" 
and instead opted to give the jury instruction proposed by the 
government on this issue (which did explain the government's burden). 
That instruction, in relevant part, required the jury to find that: 
 
       . . . the defendant conducted a financial transaction with the 
intent 
       to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or 
       control of the property which defendant believed to be the proceeds 
       of the buying, selling and dealing in narcotic and dangerous drugs. 
 
Carter, 966 F. Supp. at 350. Since this instruction clearly articulated 
the 
relevant legal criteria and fairly and adequately presented the issues of 
the case, we conclude that the court's failure to tender Carter's 
requested instruction did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
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The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
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